Abortion and the Myth of Secular Reason

by James D. Madden

The argument employed by those who oppose abortion, what I call the basic pro-life argument, has the virtue of simplicity:

(1) All cases of intentionally killing innocent human beings are morally impermissible.
(2) Abortion is an instance of intentionally killing an innocent human being.
(3) Therefore, abortion is morally impermissible.

This basic pro-life argument is most certainly valid from a logical standpoint: If it really is wrong to kill an innocent human being intentionally, and if abortion is such an act, then the laws of logic tell us that abortion is wrong. Moreover, it is important to note that this argument has not been altered very much in recent times. The position of those who oppose abortion is not something that has shifted with the foibles of political debate, but reflects a steadfast commitment to the sanctity of human life.

This stability of principle is not something enjoyed by supporters of abortion. Abortion advocates in the past tended to defend their position by calling the humanity of the fetus into question or by claiming that abortion is not intentional killing. However, these arguments have become increasingly untenable, so the pro-abortion lobby has turned to a new strategy.

The Argument from Secular Reason

Those who adopt this more recent pro-abortion strategy claim that, on the one hand, we have secular beliefs that can be justified in terms acceptable to any rational human being no matter what his or her religion or worldview. On the other hand, we have “religious beliefs” that are beliefs regarding what is sacred and that are accepted by those who have a particular faith commitment or worldview. Since religious beliefs are not necessarily shared by all citizens of a democracy, many philosophers and legal scholars believe they are irrelevant to public debate. One is entitled to any religious beliefs he or she pleases, but only secular beliefs are relevant to public life. Public debate, so the story goes, must be secular, and our reasons for our beliefs in such discussions must be accessible to anybody, not merely to those who hold certain non-rational religious dogma.

Not surprisingly, those who emphasize this distinction tend to argue that the beliefs of those who strongly oppose abortion are religious in nature. Thus, the view that human life is sacred from the moment of conception is a private religious matter, and to codify such opposition into law would be anti-democratic in the worst sense. Although an individual may believe that abortion is morally wrong, this view is best kept to oneself when speaking in the public square. I call this the argument from secular reason.

The vast influence of the argument from secular reason can be seen in the prevalence of the infamous “I am privately opposed to abortion, but . . . ” rhetoric used by many pro-abortion politicians. The argument from secular reason allows individuals to recognize the abhorrence of abortion as a private article of faith, but lets them off the hook when it comes to doing anything about it because “religious” views about the sanctity of life are inadmissible to public debate. This manner of thinking is increasingly popular among those who wish to keep abortion a legal common practice in our society, even though doing so is at odds with their religion or even their consciences.

The Breakdown of Secular Reason

One may be willing to grant that what we have been calling religious beliefs are not the appropriate basis for our legal institutions, yet deny that the pro-life position equates to such a belief. Take a moment to review the basic pro-life argument. Where is the religious dogma in this argument? Which of its simple premises are inaccessible to those who do not share a Christian worldview?

This argument is accepted by many of us who also believe that abortion is contrary to our deeply held principles of faith, but that does not imply that our belief that abortion is wrong is only an article of faith. Indeed, absent the influence of religious teachings, one would be perfectly entitled to hold the basic pro-life argument on the basis of reason alone, and there are, in fact, many non-believers who accept such an argument.

Of course, there are those who will not agree with us regarding the success of the pro-life case, but that does not show that our position is a private religious matter. Rather, all that is shown is that we have found our way into a point of intellectual dispute that requires further rational exchange.

Those who accept the argument from secular reason are ignoring the fact that a rational argument against abortion has been made and stands unanswered. It appears that the liberal political philosophers who advance the new anti-life strategy, along with the Catholic and non-Catholic politicians who seem to have adopted its rhetoric, have attempted to circumvent this failure by redefining rationality to exclude all strong pro-life beliefs.

In short, these recent philosophical attempts to defend abortion—and the public rhetoric they inspire—are signals of the intellectual defeat of the pro-abortion lobby. Abortion advocates are no longer able to make their case on an even playing field of rational discussion, so they are forced to recategorize their opponents’ beliefs such that they no longer need to address their arguments.

Not only is the argument from secular reason a signal of the philosophical defeat of the pro-abortion movement, it is also horribly damaging to our culture. Once we give up trying to address our opponents’ position with fair-minded argumentation and instead attempt to redefine reason as it suits our needs, we have given up on the very idea of rational debate. Reason becomes our plaything to be gerrymandered according to the dictates of political expediency, not an objective standard by which we judge our own views.

Down this road lies the morass of relativism, irrationalism, and fragmentation. In short, those who advocate the argument from secular reason have done much to undermine the value of reason in our culture and have simply made points of moral disagreement all the more intractable.

The Myth of Secular Reason

So far, I have argued merely that the views of many abortion opponents are mischaracterized as religious beliefs: Pro-life views are just as secular as any other rationally defensible, if controversial, philosophical positions. But one may ask, is the religious vs. secular distinction I have characterized above even meaningful? After all, the criteria for secularity have been set so very high that almost no belief can satisfy them. To qualify as a secular belief, a position would have to be something accepted by any rational being without presupposing any kind of substantive worldview or commitment to metaphysical principles.

Even today, rational men and women call into question everything from our beliefs in material objects and the roundness of the earth to the fact that men have walked on the moon. Are we to conclude that we must also assume a sort of skepticism when doing politics? Is my belief that there are material objects a private religious matter simply because some philosophers disagree with me on this point? Empty tautologies might satisfy the liberal criteria of secularity, but our practical lives call for much more robust beliefs.

All of our substantive beliefs presuppose some ultimate first principle with which somebody might disagree. Even the so-called secular beliefs of liberal political philosophers presuppose some commitment to individual dignity, freedom as a value, universal human rights, and so on. Are not these theses that rational people, in some sense, have at one time doubted? Are the foundations of liberalism then themselves religious beliefs? If earnest disagreement among reasonable people is sufficient to relegate a belief to the status of non-rational religiosity, then there can be no foundation for meaningful public discourse, for all of our beliefs that carry sufficient substance to guide practical life will fail by this standard. As understood by today’s abortion advocates, secular reason is the stuff of mythology, and the best evidence of this fact is their dogged adherence to a certain set of “religious” beliefs of their own.

In place of this legend of secular reason, we should propose what has sadly become a novel idea: Instead of worrying whether a belief is either religious or secular in order to determine its admissibility into public debate, we might concern ourselves as to whether such a belief is true. That is to say, “truth and falsity”—not “religious and secular”—should be our public standards.

I am not sanguine regarding a return to reason anytime soon in our public debate regarding life issues; one side of the aisle, after all, has practically given up on the task of meeting contrary arguments head-on in philosophical debate. However, until this gestalt shift occurs, we can expect to see pro-life views continually marginalized as irrational and irrelevant even by those who claim to share them with us as matters of “private faith.”

James D. Madden writes from Atchison, Kansas, where he lives with his wife, Jennifer, and their children, Brendan, Martha, Patrick, and William. He teaches philosophy at Benedictine College, where he won the 2006 Benedictine College Distinguished Educator of the Year Award.

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